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ABSTRACT
In the post-genomic era, large-scale personal DNA sequences
are produced and collected for genetic medical diagnoses and new
drug discovery, which, however, simultaneously poses serious chal-
lenges to the protection of personal genomic privacy. Existing
genomic privacy-protection methods are either time-consuming
or with low accuracy. To tackle these problems, this paper pro-
poses a sequence similarity-based obfuscation method, namely Iter-
MegaBLAST, for fast and reliable protection of personal genomic
privacy. Specifically, given a randomly selected sequence from a
dataset of DNA sequences, we first use MegaBLAST to find its most
similar sequence from the dataset. These two aligned sequences
form a cluster, for which an obfuscated sequence was generated via
a DNA generalization lattice scheme. These procedures are itera-
tively performed until all of the sequences in the dataset are clustered
and their obfuscated sequences are generated. Experimental results
on two benchmark datasets demonstrate that under the same degree
of anonymity, IterMegaBLAST significantly outperforms existing
state-of-the-art approaches in terms of both utility accuracy and time
complexity.
Index Terms— genomic privacy; obfuscation methods; DNA
generalization lattice; MegaBLAST; sequence similarity.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent decades have witnessed the widespread applications of ge-
nomic high-throughput technologies in personalized healthcare [1],
with which large-scale personal genomic data are produced and col-
lected for genetic medical diagnoses and new drug discovery. More-
over, individuals become more willing to share their genomic data
on some health-related websites (e.g., OpenSNP1) to learn their pre-
dispositions to genetic diseases and their ancestries [2]. These cases,
however, simultaneously pose serious challenges to the protection of
personal genomic privacy. Actually, the genomic information of an
individual can be as personally indicative as his/her fingerprint, if
not more revealing [3]. The genomic information is highly at risk
of being abused to affect employment, insurance status, etc [4]. Due
to the large size and rich information of personal genomic data, it is
much more difficult to protect the genomic privacy of an individual
than other sensitive information (such as social security numbers and
names) that can be securely protected by encryption [5]. Therefore,
it is highly required to develop efficient and fast methods for pro-
tecting genomic privacy while utilizing the genomic information for
This work was in part supported by the Brandeis Program of the Defense
Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) and Space and Naval Warfare
System Center Pacific (SSC Pacific) under Contract No. 66001-15-C-4068,
and The RGC of Hong Kong SAR, Grant No. PolyU 152068/15E.
1https://opensnp.org/
specifically designated purposes, such as medical diagnosis and new
drug discovery.
Existing approaches for genomic privacy protection can be
roughly divided into three categories: (1) cryptology-based meth-
ods [6, 7]; (2) data de-identification methods [5, 8] and (3) data
augmentation methods [9, 10]. Cryptology-based methods do not
disclose raw genomic data while supporting the genomic data min-
ing. However, this kind of methods are not suitable for long-term ge-
nomic privacy protection because the cryptographic algorithms can
be broken in a comparably shorter time than the personal genomic
privacy protection requires [2]. Besides, they offer no protection
against re-identification [11]. Data de-identification methods tend to
remove or encrypt those genomic data-associated identifiers which
are also personally specific and sensitive, such as social security
numbers or names. Nevertheless, these methods cannot guarantee
sufficient privacy protection and are not able to deal with the re-
identification problems [12]. Data augmentation methods achieve
the goal of privacy protection by generalizing or obfuscating DNA
sequences, which can make each record indistinguishable from each
other. With this kind of methods, the privacy of genomic data can be
well protected at the expense of limited loss of data utility.
Among the aforementioned methods, a DNA sequence obfus-
cation method called DNA lattice anonymization (DNALA) [10] is
one of the state-of-the-art approaches. DNALA is based on the fa-
mous k-anonymity principle [13] which uses a generalized sequence
to represent k aligned DNA sequences after sequence alignment and
clustering. In this way, individual sequences within a cluster will
not be distinguished. This method can efficiently protect the per-
sonal genomic privacy; however, it uses a low-accuracy clustering
algorithm called CLUSTALW [14] and a time-consuming sequence
alignment technique. Later, Li. et al. [15] proposed a stochastic
hill-climbing method to improve the clustering algorithm for better
performance. Recently, Li et al. [16] further reduced the informa-
tion loss for genomic privacy protection by proposing a maximum-
weight matching (MWM) based algorithm. However, these methods
are still inefficient and with low accuracy.
To address these problems, this paper proposes a sequence-
similarity based obfuscation method, namely IterMegaBLAST,
for protecting personal genomic privacy. Unlike previous meth-
ods [10,15,16], which use CLUSTALW as the clustering algorithm,
IterMegaBLAST uses MegaBLAST [17] for both sequence align-
ment and clustering. MegaBLAST is a sequence alignment search
algorithm which finds highly-similar sequences to the query one.
Specifically, given a dataset, we iteratively use MegaBLAST to find
homologs within the dataset for randomly selected query sequences.
Then, the query sequences and the corresponding homologs are
subsequently formed as clusters for further sequence obfuscation.
Our results also demonstrate that IterMegaBLAST is much faster
and more accurate than the existing state-of-the-art methods under
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the same degree of privacy protection.
2. METHOD
2.1. Problem Statement
Given a dataset of DNA sequences, our objective is to protect the
individual-specific genomic information from identification and/or
re-identification2 as much as possible while the loss of information
affecting the data utility is as little as possible. In other words, the
genomic privacy is enhanced at the expense of data precision re-
duction. One of the effective ways is to obfuscate the different in-
formation within a cluster of DNA sequences with high sequence
similarity. In this way, the individual-specific privacy information
can be preserved while the loss of information is the minimum. Due
to their special properties, DNA sequences can not be clustered if
without sequence alignment. Therefore, the procedures for a obfus-
cation method for genomic privacy protection generally include two
steps: (1) sequence alignment and clustering; and (2) obfuscation (or
anonymization).
2.2. MegaBLAST for Sequence Alignment and Clustering
MegaBLAST is a DNA sequence alignment search tool which uses
a greedy algorithm [17] to find those highly-similar sequences to the
query one. MegaBLAST is optimized to find near identities and can
provide functions of both sequence alignment and clustering. Com-
pared to the traditional BLAST algorithm [18], MegaBLAST runs
10 times faster and is particularly efficient to handle much longer
DNA sequences.3
Therefore, MegaBLAST is very suitable for our case due to the
following reasons: (1) the genomic data (i.e., DNA sequences) con-
cerned should be aligned and clustered before obfuscation methods
are used; (2) in practical situations, a fast sequence alignment and
clustering tool is highly required to deal with a tremendous number
of DNA sequences; (3) usually genomic privacy protection should
be imposed on datasets of DNA sequences within the same species,
which are often with high sequence similarity and MegaBLAST
specifically excels in handling highly-similar sequence alignment.
Because MegaBLAST can find a list of homologs4 to the query
sequence, we can select a certain number (i.e., the k defined in Sec-
tion 2.3) of the top homologs together with the query sequence to
form a cluster. Later, obfuscation methods are imposed on each clus-
ter for genomic privacy protection.
2.3. k-Anonymity
The k-anonymity [13] was initially proposed to tackle a problem
of how to make the individual data-owners indistinguishable while
their data are publicly released and remain practically useful. The
value k refers to the number of individuals (or samples) within a
cluster. In other words, the data are originally entity-specific and
well-organized which are represented by some semantic categories
(or attributes) consisting of a set of values. To prevent the data own-
ers from being re-identified, a typical k-anonymity based method
uses generalization. Generalization methods are based on a linear
and unambiguous generalization hierarchy [10] where the value at
the higher level (ancestor) is less-specific than that at the lower-level
(child). They replace the value of each individual by a higher-level
2Re-identification means matching the anonymized personal data with its
original information or owner.
3http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/staff/tao/URLAPI/new/node81.html
4A homolog is a sequence from a searching database which shares a high
sequence similarity with the query one.
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Fig. 1. The generalization hierarchy proposed in [10] for se-
quence/nucleotide obfuscation. Note that lev is the level of corre-
sponding nucleotides and the symbol ‘-’ represents the gap.
value via the generalization hierarchy rule. For example, we can
use ‘California’ to replace ‘Los Angeles’ and ‘San Diego’, and use
‘USA’ to replace ‘California’ and ‘New York’. In this way, a released
data set processed by a k-anonymity method can guarantee that an
individual’s record within this data set cannot be distinguished from
at least (k − 1) other individuals. In other words, the probability
of re-identifying an individual based on the data set is no more than
1/k. Obviously, a larger k will provide better privacy protection.
Besides generalization, suppression [19] is another way to realize
the k-anonymity.
2.4. Sequence Obfuscation
In this paper, a method proposed in [10] is used for sequence ob-
fuscation. This method used a generalization hierarchy based on the
IUPAC nucleotide representation code [20]. Generally speaking, the
basic four nucleotides (A, T, C and G) act as the elements in the
1-st level of the generalization hierarchy; in the 2-nd level, six let-
ters (R, W, M, K, S and Y) are used to represent the six different
combinations of any two nucleotides in the 1-st level; letters (D, V,
H and B as well as the gap) in the 3-rd level represent the combina-
tions of any three nucleotides plus the gap; and we use the letter N
in the 4-th level to represent all the possible situations. Details of the
generalization hierarchy is shown in Fig. 1.
Specifically, given two nucleotides qil and q
j
l in the l-th posi-
tion of the i-th and the j-th aligned DNA sequences Q(i) and Q(j),
respectively, their obfuscation (nucleotide) code is represented as
g(qil , q
j
l ). For example, given two aligned nucleotide sequence seg-
mentsCCTGTAAA andCA-GTRAA, according to the rule in Fig. 1,
their obfuscation sequence is CMNGTRAA. To measure the infor-
mation loss after sequence obfuscation, a distance measurement was
proposed in [10]. The distance between qil and q
j
l after nucleotide
obfuscation is defined as:
dist(qil , q
j
l ) = 2lev(g(q
i
l , q
j
l ))− lev(qil )− lev(qjl ), (1)
where lev(·) is the level of nucleotides. Based on Eq. 1, the dis-
tance between two aligned sequences (suppose the length of both
sequences is L) can be defined as the sum of distances of all the
nucleotides at the same positions, i.e.,
d(Q(i),Q(j)) =
L∑
l=1
dist(qil , q
j
l ). (2)
Using the two sequences CCTGTAAA and CA-GTRAA, ac-
cording to Eq. 2, we obtain the sequence distance is d = 0+2+4+
0 + 0 + 1 + 0 + 0 = 7. In our experiments, we use the distance to
measure the degree of information loss after sequence obfuscation.
Definitely, the shorter the distance is, the less the information loss
incurs after sequence obfuscation.
2.5. IterMegaBLAST for Genomic Privacy Protection
Given a dataset of DNA sequences, the procedures for our method
can be summarized in Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1, bxc means
taking the largest integer less than or equal to x; ∪ and \ are the
set union and set difference, respectively; MegaBLAST(Q(t),S(t))
means using Q(t) as the query sequence and S(t) as the searching
database to do the MegaBLAST search. Similar to other studies [16],
we set k = 2 in our experiments. Note when the number of a dataset
is odd, we need to use MegaBLAST to align the last three sequences.
After sequence alignment, we obtain the obfuscated sequence for the
query sequence and the top homolog. Then we do the second ob-
fuscation on the second top homolog and the obfuscated sequence
previously obtained.
For ease of reference, we name our method as IterMegaBLAST.
Algorithm 1 The algorithm for IterMegaBLAST
Input: A dataset D = {Pi}Ni=1 of N DNA sequences.
Output: A set of obfuscated sequences G and a set of distances d
between sequences and their obfuscated sequences.
1: t = 0;
2: G = d = ∅;
3: R = [1, . . . , N ];
4: Set the initial dataset D0 = D;
5: Set the initial query and the homolog Q(0) = H(0) = ∅;
6: while t 6 (bN/2c − 1) do
7: t← t+ 1;
8: Dt ← Dt−1 \ (Q(t−1) ∪H(t−1));
9: Randomly select the t-th query sequence Q(t) from Dt;
10: Let the searching database be S(t) = Dt \Q(t);
11: Get the top homolog to the queryQ(t) by MegaBLAST, i.e.,
H(t) = MegaBLAST(Q(t),S(t));
12: R← R \⋃Ni=1 {i : (Pi = Q(t))||(Pi = H(t))};
13: Obtain the obfuscated sequence g(Q(t),H(t)) by the se-
quence obfuscation method stated in Section 2.4;
14: G ← G ∪ g(Q(t),H(t));
15: Calculate the distance d(Q(t),H(t)) according to Eq. 2;
16: d← d ∪ d(Q(t),H(t));
17: end while
18: t← bN/2c;
19: if N is odd then
20: g(Q(t),H(t)) = g(g(PR(1),PR(2)),PR(3));
21: else
22: g(Q(t),H(t)) = g(PR(1),PR(2));
23: end if
24: G ← G ∪ g(Q(t),H(t));
25: Calculate the distance d(Q(t),H(t)) according to Eq. 2;
26: d← d ∪ d(Q(t),H(t));
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
3.1. Datasets
Two datasets (Dataset I and Dataset II) [16] were used to evaluate the
performance of IterMegaBLAST. Both datasets are human DNA se-
quences. Dataset I is a group of DNA sequences in the melanocortin
gene promoter region while Dataset II is in the human mitochondrion
control region. The numbers of sequences for these two datasets are
56 and 372, respectively. The average sequence length of Dataset I
(6.6 kb) is much longer than that of Dataset II (0.5 kb).
The average distance between sequences and their obfuscated
sequences, and the time complexity were used to measure the per-
formance of different algorithms. Note that because all of the al-
gorithms we compared in this paper are based on the k-anonymity,
the degree of anonymity (or degree of privacy) [21] should be the
same when k is the same. Therefore, we do not report the degree of
privacy.
3.2. Performance of IterMegaBLAST Varying with respect to
the Number of Sequences
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Fig. 2. The average distances of IterMegaBLAST varying with re-
spect to the number of DNA sequences for (a) Dataset I and (b)
Dataset II. The shorter the distance is, the less the information loss.
DNALA is from [10], while all of MWM , Hybrid and Online algo-
rithms are from [16].
Fig. 2 compares IterMegaBLAST against several state-of-the-art
privacy-protection methods for both Dataset I and Dataset II when
the number of DNA sequences gradually increase. DNALA [10]
uses a multiple sequence alignment technique for sequence align-
ment and uses the CLUSTALW for clustering. All of MWM, Online
and Hybrid use global pairwise sequence alignment, while for clus-
tering, they use maximum weight matching [16], an online algorithm
[16] and hybrid of the former two algorithms. IterMegaBLAST uses
an iterative MegaBLAST for both sequence alignment and cluster-
ing. The performance is measured by the average distances between
sequences and their obfuscated sequences. The shorter the distance
Table 1. Comparing IterMegaBLAST with state-of-the-art genomic
privacy-protection methods. m ± n denotes (mean)±(standard de-
viation). The performance is measured by the average distance be-
tween DNA sequences and their obfuscated sequences. The shorter
the distance is, the less the information loss. MSA: multiple se-
quence alignment; PSA: pairwise sequence alignment.
Dataset Method MSA PSA
I
DNALA [10] 13.79 13.57
MWM [16] 13.39 13.18
Online [16] 16.93 16.81
Stochastic hill-climbing [15] 13.39 13.18
IterMegaBLAST — 10.67 ± 1.07
II
DNALA [10] 3.33 3.35
MWM [16] 2.99 2.98
Online [16] 3.79 3.80
Stochastic hill-climbing [15] 3.13 3.11
IterMegaBLAST — 3.00 ± 0.10
is, the less the information loss. Because the query DNA sequences
for IterMegaBLAST are randomly selected, the performance of Iter-
MegaBLAST may vary a bit even when the same DNA sequences
are used. To reduce the bias, we performed IterMegaBLAST ten
times for each case (number of sequences). For ease of presentation,
only the average performance is shown.
As can be seen from Fig. 2(a), IterMegaBLAST significantly
outperforms all of the state-of-the-art methods in all cases when the
number of sequences increases from 10 to 56. While the average
distances of all of MWM, DNALA, Hybrid and Online are strictly
monotonically decreasing with the number of sequences, this is not
the case for IterMegaBLAST, which achieves its best performance
when the number of sequences is 20. It is noted that because all
of these five methods are based on k-anonymity (i.e., k = 2), the
degree of anonymity [21], which is to measure the degree of how
well the privacy is protected, should be the same. Therefore, exper-
imental results suggest that under the same degree of anonymity,
IterMegaBLAST can maintain the least information loss for data
utility among all the genomic privacy-protection methods. The re-
sults also suggest that sequence similarity based methods (i.e., Iter-
MegaBLAST) can provide sufficient privacy protection for genomic
data (particularly long DNA sequences) while the information loss
maintains at a low level.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from Fig. 2(b) except that Iter-
MegaBLAST may be only comparable to (if not better than) MWM,
particularly when the number of sequences is larger than 300. Except
MWM, IterMegaBLAST performs better than DNALA and Online
for all the ranges of sequence numbers, and outperforms the Hy-
brid algorithm for all cases except when the number of sequences
is around 325. This is probably because the lengths of DNA se-
quences are vary short (average 0.5kb) and MegaBLAST is better
able to handle long DNA sequences. Moreover, we would like to
emphasize that the number of non-standard nucleotides (e.g., N) in
the sequences of Dataset II is much larger than that of Dataset I,
which contributes to more information loss whereas MegaBLAST
treats them with equal weights as those standard nucleotides. On the
other hand, MWM directly uses the minimum distance as the criteria
to cluster the sequences.
3.3. Comparing with State-of-the-Art Predictors
To further demonstrate the superiority of IterMegaBLAST, Ta-
ble 1 compares the performance of IterMegaBLAST against several
state-of-the-art privacy-protection methods. Another algorithm
Table 2. Comparing the computational time of IterMegaBLAST
with that of state-of-the-art genomic privacy-protection methods.
MSA: multiple sequence alignment; PSA: pairwise sequence align-
ment.
Dataset Method Time (seconds)
I
MWM + MSA [16] > 9000
MWM + PSA [16] > 7000
IterMegaBLAST 112
II
MWM + MSA [16] > 2000
MWM + PSA [16] > 2000
IterMegaBLAST 384
called stochastic hill-climbing [15] is added to compare with Iter-
MegaBLAST. Moreover, DNALA, MWM, Online and Stochastic
hill-climbing are capable of performing multiple sequence alignment
(MSA) and pairwise sequence alignment (PSA).5 Note that it is also
possible to do multiple sequence alignment for IterMegaBLAST and
we will do it in our future research.
As can be seen from Table 1, for Dataset I, IterMegaBLAST
remarkably outperforms all of the four state-of-the-art methods, no
matter they use MSA or PSA; while for Dataset II, IterMegaBLAST
performs better than DNALA, Online and stochastic hill-climbing,
but its performance is comparable to (if not better than) that of
MWM.
Table 2 compares the computational time of IterMegaBLAST
against MWM equipped with either PSA or MSA.6 Since MWM
performs the best among the four aforementioned methods, we only
report the computational time of MWM here. As can be seen, Iter-
MegaBLAST performs impressively faster than MWM + PSA and
MWM + MSA for both datasets. The reason is that IterMegaBLAST
only needs to use MegaBLAST for bN/2c times and each time the
number of sequences in the searching database will decrease. As we
have mentioned, MegaBLAST performs 10 times faster than tradi-
tional BLAST, whereas MWM has to obtain all the pair-wise dis-
tances for all sequences. Interestingly, the computational time of
IterMegaBLAST for Dataset II is much longer than that for Dataset
I. This is because the number of sequences in Dataset II is much
larger, causing a significantly larger number of MegaBLAST invo-
cations for Dataset II. Moreover, MegaBLAST is more capable of
handling long sequences like Dataset I, which also explains why the
time advantage of IterMegaBLAST over MWM is more obvious for
Dataset I than that for Dataset II.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes an accurate and efficient approach, namely
IterMegaBLAST, which leverages sequence similarity and informa-
tion obfuscation for genomic privacy protection. Given a dataset of
DNA sequences, we formed clusters by iteratively selecting query
sequences and finding their top homologs by MegaBLAST. Sub-
sequently, the aligned sequences in each cluster were obfuscated
by replacing the different nucleotides with their lowest common
ancestors via a DNA generalization lattice scheme. It was found
that IterMegaBLAST performs much better than existing genomic
privacy-preserving methods with less information loss and higher
efficiency under the same degree of genomic privacy protection.
5We do not report the performance of the hybrid algorithm here because
[16] does not provide the related results.
6Note that the results of computational time for MWM are obtained from
[16]. The configuration of our local computer may be different from that
in [16]. However, we give credits to them by using only one core of our
computer with a common configuration.
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